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Adding Complexity to Confusion and Seeing the
Light: Feminist Legal Insights and the Jurisprudence
of the Religion Clauses
Leslie Gielow Jacobs t
INTRODUCTION

What is religious freedom and how does the government guarantee it?
These are the questions with which the United States Supreme Court has
struggled throughout its history of attempting to interpret the two religion
clauses of the First Amendment. No one seems happy with the results. 1 To
be fair to the Court, the words of the religion clauses are "at best opaque. "2
The two clauses alternately prohibit the government from making a "law

respectingan establishmentof religion"and require that it not "prohibit[] the
free exercise thereof. "3 These two guarantees create an inevitable tension. 4
Often, what one clause appears to require , the other prohibits.5 Without a
clear and justifiable definition of religious freedom to guide interpretation, the
Court's efforts to ensure the "preeminent goal of the First Amendment, " 6
government neutrality toward religion, will remain muddled. 7
Feminist legal theory does not speak directly to the issue of religious
freedom. It is, however, deeply concerned with defining and achieving gender
freedom. The feminist experience of striving toward gender freedom informs
efforts to define other types of freedom as well. Increasingly, the use of

t Assistant Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. B.A. , 1982,
Wesleyan University; J.D., 1985, University of Michigan. Thanks to Julie Davies, Joshua Dressler, J.
Clark Kelso, Brian Landsberg, and Benjamin Wagner for providing helpful criticism on earlier drafts of
this article. Thanks also to Spencer Skeen for his research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why is ReligionSpecial: ReconsideringtheAccomnu,dationof Religion
UndertheReligionClausesojrheFimAmendmenr,52 U. Prrr. L. REV.75, 75 (1990)(.Almosteveryone ,
including most of the present membership of the Supreme Court, is dissatisfied with the current state of
constitutionallaw regarding church and state."); StevenD. Smith, TheRise andFall ofReligiousFreedom
in ConstitulionalDiscourse,140 U. PA. L. R:ev.149, 225-26 (1991) ("[JJudicial decisions expounding
and enforcing the Constitution's religion clauses are characterized by massive incoherence.").
2. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
3. U.S. CONST.amend. I.
4. See sources cited infranote 16.
S. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. l, 18 (1989) (finding that Texas sales tax
exemptionfor religious publicationsviolatesestablishmentclause, although free exercise clause couldjustify
such exemptions where payment of tax would inhibit relieious activity); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 276 (1981) ("[S)tate interest .. . in achieving greater separation of church and state than is
already ensured under the EstablishmentClause ... is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case
by the Free Speech Clause as well.").
6. Edwatds v. Aillillard, 482 U.S. 578, 616 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see aJsccasescited infra
note 21.
7. See Douglas Laycock, Formal,Substantive,and Disaggreg01ed
NeutralityTowardReligion, 39
DEPAULL. RBV.993 (1990) (distinguishingdifferent meaningsof government neutrality toward religion);
in Establishment
ClauseDoctrine,48 U. Pm. L. Rsv. 83,
John T. Yalauri, TheConceptofNeurra/iry
84 {1986) (noting that no unifying conception of neutrality runs through establishment clause cases).
Copyright O 1995 by the Yale Journal of I.aw and Feminism
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feminist legal insights extends beyond what have traditionally been considered
"women's issues."
Striking similarities exist between the Court's mission in interpreting the
religion clauses and the challenge of developing feminist legal insights. Both
the religion clauses and feminist legal insights grew out of experiences of
exclus.ion and oppression. 8 A primary purpose of both the religion clauses and
feminist legal theory is to guarantee a realm of freedom for all individuals.
This purpose entails defining a sphere of protection for less powerful groups
and individuals. The challenge, both for the Court in articulating a
jurisprudence of the religion clauses and for feminists in developing legal
insights, is to give meaning to the broad concept of freedom in light of current
and changing historical circumstances and in light of diverse contemporary
public perspectives as to the appropriate meaning of freedom.
Because the jurisprudence of the religion clauses and feminist legal thought
arise from a common experience and share a common goal, feminist legal
insights provide assistance in interpreting the religion clauses. Applying
feminist legal insights to the jurisprudence of the religion clauses leads to a
number of specific conclusions. First, the Court's purported goal of ensuring
the religious freedom for all that the religion clauses guarantee by demanding
government "neutrality" toward religion is deceptive: neutrality has many
possible meanings and any determination of a particular meaning depends
initially on perspective. Second, the Court's chosen definition of neutrality
depends upon baseline perceptions that reflect majority presumptions, and
thereby validates government actions that have a disproportionate adverse effect
on the religious freedom of minority religious groups and practitioners who
do not share the majority presumptions. Third, feminist legal insights lead to
a unique condemnation of this result. Rather than advocating the ambiguous
concept of neutrality, feminist legal insights counsel that the goal of religious
diversity should guide the Court's interpretation of the religion clauses. This
approach represents an important shift in focus. It emphasizes the needs of
more and less powerful religious groups and individuals to be able to pursue
their different visions of religious freedom, rather than the need to achieve
some elusive concept of government neutrality. The feminist lesson is that in
order to be meaningful, the guarantee of religious freedom must also be a
guarantee of inclusion. A Court guided by an emphasis on religious diversity
can deliver on this guarantee in a way that a Court guided by a focus on
neutrality canriot.
Part I of this article sets out the current jurisprudence of the religion
clauses. It situates and describes the current understanding of government
neutrality that the Court employs to guide its interpretation. Part II canvasses
a number of feminist legal insights and then utilizes them to critique the current
jurisprudence of the religion clauses and to propose · revised guidelines. Part
8. Seediscussion i,ifra parts 1, II.
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III applies the critique and proposed revisions set out in Part II to the Court's
most recent decision under the religion clauses: Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet. 9
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES

The First Amendment provides that · "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
10
••••
"
Members of the Supreme Court frequently have noted that the
purpose of the establishment clause and the free exercise clause, taken
together, is to guarantee religious freedom. 11 The language of the clauses,
however, does not delineate the precise nature or scope of the religious
freedom that both are to protect. 12 Neither the understanding of the clauses'
d.rafters13 nor specific public understandings 14 nor practices 15 at the time of
their ratification provide the Court with definitive guidance . The fact that the
two clauses can appear to issue contradictory commands compounds the
problem of interpretation . 16 When, for example, public assistance eligibility
9. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
10. U.S. CoNST.amend. I. Althoughthe words of the Constitutionrefer to "Congress" only, the Court
hasheld that both clauses are applicable to the states. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947)
{holdingthat establishmentclauseapplies to states); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding
that free exercise clause applies to states).
11. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112S. Ct. 2649, 2665 (1992) (Blaclcmun,J., concurring) (noting "the
common purpose of securing religious liberty"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor,
J,, concurring) ("Although a dist.inctjurisprudence has enveloped each of these Clauses, their common
purposeis to secure religious liberty. On these principles the Court has been and remains unanimous.")
(citation omitted); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (noting Mageneral harmony of
purpose between the two religious clauses of the First Amendment"); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 2'rl (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring)(nocingthat establishmentclause and free exercise clause "serv(e)
the same goal of individual religious freedom"); id. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that the two
religion clauses "are to be read together, and in light of the single end [the promotion of religious liberty]
which they are designed to serve"); Everson,330 U.S. at 40 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (noting that for
James Madison, "'establishment' and ' free exercise' were correlative and coextensive ideas, representing
only different facets of the single great and fundamental freedom").
12. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602. 612 (1971) ("The language of the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendmentis at best opaque .... ").
13. See LAVR.ENCE
H. TRIBE
, AMERICANCONSTTTtrrJONAL
LAW§ 14-3, at 1158-59 (2d ed. 1988)
(summarizing "at least three distinct schools of thought which influenced the drafters of the Bill of Rights
... [which are] in some respects complementary, and in others conflicting").
14. See Smith, supranote 1, at 157 (contrasting "the pervasively religious world view" that prevailed
at the time that the religion clauses became a part of the Constitution with the assumptions that underpin
the Court's understandingof religious freedom).
15. JOHNE. NOWAK
& RONALD
E. ROTUNDA
, CoNSTITUTIONAL
LAW1160 (4th ed. 1991) (noting
that in some states "close ties existed between church and state, with a number of states having established
churches until well after the time of the revolution"); see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 669-70 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissentingin part) (stating it is "settled law" that
"historical practices" have "inform(ed] ... First Amendmentjurisprudence," but noting limits on extent
to which they can inform decisions); id. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Historical acceptance of a
practice does not in itself validate that practice under the EstablishmentClause if the practice violates the
values protected by that Clause.•); Wal.zv. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) ("[N]o one a~uires
a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitutionby long use, even when that span of time covers
our entire national existence and indeed predates it.").
16. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973)
("[T]his Court repeatedly has recognized that tension inevitably exists between the Free Exercise and
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requirements demand activity that conflicts with an applicant's religious belief,
does the free exercise clause prohibit enforcing the requirements7t 7 Or would
an exemption from such requirements constitute an establishment of
religion?" When a religious group s'eeks access to public facilities available
to nonreligious groups, does the free exercise clause require access or does
the establishment clause forbid it? 19 These are the types of issues with which
the Supreme Court has wrestled in its efforts to distill and articulate the
meaning of the religion clauses.
Although the Court traditionally has interpreted and analyzed the two
clauses discretely,20 one concept has characterized its efforts to define
religious freedom under both clauses. This concept is government neutrality,21
both with respect to particular religions22 and between religion and
nonreligion. 23 The Court has identified this aspiration of neutrality as the one
Establishment Clauses."); NOWAK& ROTUNDA,
supra note 15, at 1157 ("There is a natural antagonism
between a command not to establish religion and a command not to inhibit its practice."); TRIBB,supra
note 13, § 14-2, at 1157 ("[S)erious tension has often surfaced between the two clauses.") .
17. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting Native American parents' claim that because
assigning their daughter social :securitynumber would damage her spiritual growth, free exercise clause
required that she be exempted from general requirement that recipients of food stampsand AFDC have
such numbers).
18. See, e.g., Philip Kurland, Of Churchand Stale and the Supreme Coun , 29 U. cm.L. REv. 1,
5 (1961) (argui11&
that the religion clauses should be interpreted so that "religion may not be used as a basis
for classification for purposes of government[al]action"). See generallyIra C. Lupu, Reconstructing the
Establishme,uClause: The Ca.seAgainst DiscreticnaryAccommodationef Religion, 140 U. PA. L. Rl!v.
555 (1991) (same); Mark Tushnet, "Of Churchand Sta1tand theSupreml!Coun•: KurlandRevisited,1989
SUP.er. RBv. 373.
19. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holdingthat establishmentclause does not forbid
public university from giving access to student religious group on same basis as other groups, and holding
that free speech clause prohibits university from denying group accctsson basis of content of its speech);
seealso Board of Educ. v. Mcrgens, 496 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1990) (plurality opinion) (applying W'uimar
and holding that congressional statute that require.s equal access for religious groups in poblic secondary
schools does not violate the establishment clause).
20. Set: Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67-68 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("IA] distinct
jurisprudence has enveloped each of these Oauses .•.. ").
21. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & ReligiousLiberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973) ("A
proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a
course of 'neutrality' toward religion.w); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (noting that a
regulation "offend[s] the constitutionalrequirement for govemment neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion"); seealsoWelsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., dissenting)
("[N)eutrality, is the goal of the religion clauses of the First Amendment."); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("The attitude of government toward religion must, as this
Court has frequently observed, be one of neutrality."); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962)
(Douglas, J. , concurring) ("The First Amendment leaves the Government in a position not of hostility to
'
religion but of neutrality.").
22. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest command ofth.e Establishment
Clause is that one religious denominationcannot be officiallypreferred over ano~her."); Zorach v. Qauson,
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ("The government must be neutral when it comes to competition between
sects.").
23. See Tex.as Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9·10 (1989) (" It is pan of our settled
jurisprudence that 'the 8tablishment Clause prohibits aovernment from abandoning secular purposesin
order to put an imprimatur . .. on religion as such.'") (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 431,
450 (1971)); Wallace,472 U.S. al 54 (reaffirming the principle of government neutrality between religion
and nonreligion despite Justice Rehnquist's assertion in dissent that establishment clause prohibits only
"preference among religious sects or denominations");Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. l, 18 (1947)
("[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers
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that allows government to steer a safe course between the Scylla and Charybdis
of the two clauses, 24 which prevent government alternately from aiding or
inhibiting religious belief. 25 Because the Court uses the concept of
government neutrality as its primary tool for interpreting the meaning of the
religion clauses, we must examine the Court's concept of neutrality if we are
to illuminate its understanding of the religious freedom guaranteed by the
clauses.
Although the Court has adhered consistently to the verbal formulation of
government neutrality, its more specific methods of defining the demands of
the two religion clauses have been undergoing doctrinal change. Until recently,
the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtunan 26 structured the Court's
efforts to define government neutrality under the establishment clause. The
Lemon test stipulated three conditions for government acts that arguably aid
religion. First , the acts must have a secular purpose. Second, they must have
a principal or primary effect that does not advance or inhibit religion. Third,
they must not give rise to excessive government entanglement with religion.27
The Court has been moving away from the Lemon test, although it has not yet
formally overruled it. 28 Criticisms of the Lemon standard have focused on
its variability and indeterminacy.29 In the move away from Lemon, the Court
has attempted to pick and choose among its precedents to reach a clearer and
more consistent definition of government neutrality toward religion.
and non-believen .•.. "); su also Michael W. McConnell, ReligiousFreedomaJ a Crossroads,59 U.
CH1. L. Rev. 115, 14546 (1992) (noting that Justice Rehnquist has argued for nonpreferentialist
interpretation, but probably will rely less on it in future because of historical research demonstrating that
position is inconsistent with original intent) (citing Douglas Laycock, The Originsof the Religion Clauses
of the Con.stitwion:"N011preferential"
Aid to Religion: A False ClaimAbout OriginalIntent, 21 WM. &
MARYL. Rev. 875 (1986)).
24. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (lamenting that
the Court had broadly construed both clauses, thereby unnecessarily narrowing "the channel between [the
two obstacles] through which any state or federal action must passin order to survive constitutional
scrutiny"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has struuled to find a neutral
coursebetween the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which,
if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.").
25. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) ("[O]ur
cases require the State to maintainan attitudeof 'neutrality,' neither 'advancing' nor 'inhibiting' reli&ion.").
26. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
27. Id. at 612-13.
28. Compart Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (not relying explicitly on Lemon)
and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. a. 2462 (1993) (same) and Lee v. Weisman, 112
S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (same) with Lamb's Oiapel v. Center Moriches UnionFree Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2148 n.7 (1993) ("(T]here is a proper way to inter an established decision and Lemon ... has not been
overruled.") and Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2663 n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Since 1971, the
Court has decided 31 Establishment Clause cases. In only one insta.nce, [Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783 (1983)), has the Court not rested its decision on the basic principles described in Lemon.").
29. See,e.g., Gruma, 114 S. a. at 2499 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Any test that must deal with
widelydisparate situationsrisks being so vague as to be useless."); Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissentin&)("The
problem with (and the allure of) Lemonhas not been that it is 'riaid, • but rather that in many applications
it has been utterly meaningless, validatingwhatever result the Court would desire." ); Wallace,472 U.S.
at 112 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting) (the Lemen test has pro<hlcedonly "consistent unpredictability"). See
gtnerally Carl H. Esbeck, The Ltmon Tesr:ShouldIt Be Retained,RifonnulaJtd. or Rejected?,4 NOTRE
DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 513, 543 (1990) ("It is hard to think of a contemporary legal doctrine
that is as besieged from all quarters as is the Lemo·n test.").
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Until recently, the Court purported to apply a balancing test to free
exercise clause questions, weighing the government's interest in uniform
application of a given requirement against the burden that the requirement
imposes on the complaining religious practitioner. 30 In 1990, the Court
explicitly refined its doctrine to eliminate the compelling interest balancing test
in favor of a simpler and more determinate judicial formula. 31
The Court's efforts to clarify and harmonize previous precedents yield its
understa nding of government neutralit y. This understanding in turn undergirds
the Court's definition of the religious freedom which is the goal of the two
clau ses. Most crucially, government neutrality for the Court means the absence
of a purpose to aid or restrict religious practices "because of their religious
motivation. "32 In contrast to such a purpose, however, an advantageous or
disadvantageous effect on such practices does not for the Court call into
question the neutrality of the government's ·action. If the effects on religious
practice are not the intentional products of government decisionmaking, then
they are necessarily "incidental" or "attenuated. "33 This characterization of
30. A number of th~ cases applied a test requiring a "compelling" state interest to justify imposing
a burden on religious practice. In these cases, the Court found the free exercise clause required an
exemption for the claimants from aenerally applicable legal requirements that burdened their religious
practice. See Hobbie v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (claim for
unemployment benefits); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
we must
U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (" Where fundame.ntal claims of religious freedom are at stake ...
searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promoteby its requirement ... and the impediment
to those objectives that would flow from recoanizine the claimed ... exception."); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (applying a compelling interest balancin&test to a religious practitioner's claim for
unemployment benefits based on her terminationbecause the work schedule conflicted with her religious
beliefs); seealsoHernandezv. Commissioner,490 U.S. 680, 699-700(1989)(finding government's interest
in uniform applicationof the tax laws to be compelling); UnitedStates v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (same);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (applying compellina interest test to military draft
requirement and upholding requirement).
Other cases applied a more lenient standard, still phrased in terms of a balancing test, and rejected
the free exercise claim. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707--08(1986) (nondiscriminatory
government benefit requirements need only be "reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public
interest"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259 (accommodatina Amish objection to compulsory
participation in social security system would "unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental
interest"); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 462 (incidental burdens of military draft on conscientious objectors are
"strictly justified by substantial governmentalinterests"); seealsoGoldmanv. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,
507 (1986) ("[W]hen evaluatin&whether military needs justify a particular restriction on religiously
motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to the professionaljudgment of military authorities
concernina the relative importance of a particular military interest.").
31. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990) ("generally applicable, relieionneutral laws" need not be justified under a compelling interest standard or balancing test); see also id. at
878-79 ("We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.~).
32. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2227 (1993).
33. See.e.g., Gnunet, 114S. Ct. at 2489 (where thegovernment delegatescivic authority to religious
bodies, constitutionality may be located "in the distinction between a government's purposeful delegation
on the basis of religion and a deteaation on principles neutral to religion, to individuals whose religious
identities are incidental to their receipt of civic authority"); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113
S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993) ("[W]e have consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide
benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an
Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutionsmay also receive an attenuated financial
benefit.~); Smirh,494 U.S. at 878 c·[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the object of [a
government action] but merely the incidentaleffect of a generally applicableand otherwise valid provision,
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the government action's purpose, rather than a consideration of the magnitude
of its effect, determines whether the action is constitutional. 34
For example, under the establishment clause the neutrality, and hence the
constitutionality, of government financial aid to parochial school activities
depends upon the method by which public funds arrive at the religious
institutions, not their amount. The Court has characterized direct benefits as
non-neutral because such benefits constitute aid that moves without an
intermediary from the government to religious organizations. 35 Although
attenuated benefits, like direct benefits, "ultimately flow[ ] to religious
institutions," they do so "only as a result of the genuinely independent and
private choices of a·id recipients. "36 The religious institutions are therefore
"only incidental beqeficiaries. "37 The decision to advance religion is thereby
a private one and not fairly attributable to government decisionmaking. 38
A related factor in establishment clause neutrality is whether instances of
government aid "provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without
reference to religion. "39 The breadth of the class benefitted has been a crucial
factor in the determination of the constitutionality of a number of school aid
programs, 40 as well as other government programs that provide aid to
religious organizations. 41 By contrast, some government aid programs have
been struck down as unconstitutional because their classifications were limited
to religious beneficiaries. 42
the First Amendmentbas not been offended.").
(noting that Court had previously upheld a MiMeSota law
34. Su Zcbrest, 113 S. Ct at 2~7
allowing taxpayers to deduct certain eduational expenses "even though the vast majority of those
deo.Ictions(perhapSover 90%) wem to parents whose children attended sectarian schools") (citing Mueller
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)); Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (listing cases where the Court denied a free
exercise clause claim despite the effects of the state action on reliaious practice); Mueller,463 U.S. at
401 (stating that Court was "loathe to adopt a rule groundina the constitutionalityof a facially neutral law"
on quantitative recitations of impact of law).
35. Su Zcbrest, 113 S. Ct at 2468 (distinguishing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and
School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), as involvin&direct grants of eovemment aid).
36. z.obrest, 113 S. Ct at 2467 (quotingWitters v. WashingtonDep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 487 (1986)).
37. Id. at 2469.
38. Id. at 2467 ("[B]ecause the rDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian
school, an interpreter's presence there cannot be attributed to state decision making.").
39. Id. at 2466.
40. See id.; see also Witters,474 U.S. at 487 (noting, in upholdin&Washington's extension of
vocational rehabilitation assistmce to student at Christian college, that Washington's assistance program
was "'made available generally without regard 10 the sectarian-nonsectarian. .. nature of the institution
benefited'") (quotingCommittee for Pub. Educ. & Reliaious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.38
(1973)); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398 {1983)(upholding law that permits parents to deduct their
children's educational expenses for public school or private schools).
41. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. !189(1988) (holding that Adolescent Fainily Life Act
may designate religious organizations as providers of counseling because the organizations are listed as
pan of general group of other providers); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property
tax exemptions for religious organizations in part because many other nonreligious organizations receive
them); see also Mueller,463 U.S. at 397 & n.7 (distmauishina Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973),
and Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, on grounds that the aid in those cases singled out a class of citizens for special
economicbenefit).
42. See, e.g., Grumet,114 S. Ct. at 2481 (striking down a New York statute creating special school
district for town with boundaries drawnto include only property owned and inhabited by practitioners of
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While the requirement that the government treat religious entities and
practitioners exactly the same as oilier groups and individuals is important in
establishment clause jurisprudence: it ·CO!llpletely defines the government's
obligations under the free exercise clause. 43 A "generally applicable, religionneutral l~w[ ] " cannot unconstitutionally burden a religious practice. 44 Thus
a state may criminalize the use of peyote and deny unemployment benefits to
individuals discharged from their jobs for using peyote as part of a Native
American religious ceremony. This reasoning has held despite the fact that for
some Native Americans peyote use defines "the essential ritual of their
religion" and the impact on religious practice of criminalizing it is "potentially
devastating. "45 Similarly, the federal government may require Native
Americans to obtain a social security number for their children in order to
receiv e government benefits despite the claim that such an act would murder
the children's souls. 46 The government also may prohibit a military officer
from wearing a yarmulke indoors, 47 desecrate federal lands sacred to Native
Americans, 48 and refuse to excuse prison inmates from work requirements to
attend religious services. 49 These incidental effects of neutral government
actions survive constitutional scrutiny because they do not represent attempts
to regulate or prohibit conduct because it is undertaken for religious
reasons. 50
Under the free e~rcise clause government actions that single out religious
entities or practitioners for disadvantageoustreatment "must undergo the most
rigorous of scrutiny. " 51 Under the establishment clause, however, government
treads close to a violation when it grants specific beneficial treatment to a
religious entity or practitioner. The Court's analysis is more lenient in this
area. In two types of situations the Court has interpreted the religion clauses
to permit a link between government benefits and religious practice or belief.
One such instance is where the government acts to lift a preexisting burden
on religious practice. Although the Court has reasoned that the free exercise
clause does not requite government to grant religious entities or .practitioners

strict form of Judaism); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (striking down state statute
that exempted only religious publicationsfrom certain tax).
·
43. Congressclaimedthat it "restoreld) the compellinginterest test" in cases in whichindividualsseek
exemptionfrom a generallyapplicablerule that substantiallyburdensreligious practice. ReligiousFreedom
RestorationAct of 1993,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(West i994). The Act's constitutionalityon this front under
the establishmentclause is uncertain. See Ira C. Lupu, SraruresRevolvingin COIIJtirutional
I.Aw Orbits,
79 VA. L. REV.l (1993).
44. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990).
45. Id. at 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
47. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
48. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
49. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
50. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2233 (1993) (noting
that laws which target religious conduct for distinctivetreatment, or which adva.nce governmentalinterest
against only religiously motivated conduct, survive strict scrutiny Kenlyin rare cases").
51. Id. at 2233.
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exemptions from generally applicable laws,52 it has interpreted the
establishment clause to permit such exemptions obtained through the political
process." Where the government explicitly benefits religious groups and
practitioners in lawmaking, the Court's inquiry will center on whether the
result is to lift a preexisting burden on religious practi ce.54
Even when it can identify no preexisting burden, the Court has been
reluctant to adopt an understanding of government neutrality that prohibits any
government recognition of religion. The second instance in which the Court
may find that an explicit link between government and religion survives
establishment clause scrutiny is when the government aid to religion is in the
form of symbolic recognition . In a line of cases involving such
symbolic-rather than financial-advantages, the Court has struggled to define
government neutrality to allow some, but not all, government use of
traditionally religious symbols or practices. 55
The constitutionality of seasonal displays that contain religious imagery
probably constitutes the most confused area of the Court' s juri spruden ce. 56
In one holiday display case, the Court found the public display of a city-owned
creche in a private park to be constitutional. 57 In the only other such case,
the Court held that the display of a privately-owned creche on public property
violated the Constitution. 58 The explanation the Court offers for the different
results in these two cases is that in one instance the creche was surrounded by
other, more secular holiday symbols such as Santa Claus, plastic reindeer and
a talking wishing well. 59 In the other, the creche "stood alone" except for
a background of poinsettias which, instead of secularizing the display, only
highlighted its religious aspects.60 In addition, while invalidating the latte r
holiday creche display, the Court upheld the same county's display ,of a
menorah. 61 According to the Court, a Christmas tree and a seaso nal greeting
52. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is
permitted... is not to say that it is constitutionallyrequired.A).
53. Id. ("Values that are protected from government interference through enshrinement in the Bill
of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process.").
54. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2494 (determining that the creation of a special school district around
the boundariesof a Saunar Hasidic Village was not a permissible accommodationof a burden).
55. Where such activity occurs in public schools, the Court has consistently prohibited it. See Lee
v. Weisman, 112 S. Cl. 2649 (1992) (graduation prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (postina
of the Ten Commandments); Enael v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer). In other public arenas,
however, the Court has been more ambivalent. SeeCounty of Alleaheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)
(holding County's cr~he display is unconstitutional, while display includinga menorah is constitutional);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (creche display in public park is constitutional); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)(legislative prayer is constitutional).
56. See Smith, supra note 1, at 226 (noting that inconsistentdoctrinesarise not only between different
cases, but also wiLhinsinale decisions, such as Allegheny).
51. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
58. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573.
59. Id. at 598. Practitioners have referred to this as the "plastic reindeer rule." See McConnell,
ReligiousFreedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115 (1992); Jeffrey Rosen, LemenLaw, nmNEW
REPUBLIC,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 17, 17.
60. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 599.
61. Id. at 620-21.
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sign that also appeared in the menorah display secularized the display, thereby
rendering it constitutional. 62
The Court has not decided upon a test to apply when government explicitly
advantages religion through symbolic recognition. 63 Justices have proposed
that either government endorsement64 or coercion 65 of religious belief should
be the mark of constitutional invalidity. Despite differences in formulation and
focus, 66 the two approaches are similar in that they both look to the
reasonable perceptions of a nonadherent as the benchmark for constitutional
invalidity.67 Because of this focus on perceptions, neither test affords
predictability of application in specific circumstances. 68
In sum, the Court has defined a concept of neutrality that animates its
religion clauses jurisprudence. Although perhaps not completely consistent,
the particulars of the Court's conception are fairly clear. The crux of the
62. Id. at 614.
63. The O>wt appeared to embrace the endorsement test in Allegheny. Id. at S93. But in Lee v.
Weismanthe Court applied a coercion test, without deciding whether endorsement would also be a mark
of constitutional invalidity. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992). Since thosedecisions were reached, theO>urt's
membership has changed; it is unclear where the majority of today's Court stands.
64. Alleghelf)',492 U.S. at 593; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'O>MOr, J.,
concurring) ("Direct government action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is invalid
... because it 'sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an aixompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community.·-) (citations omitted).
6S. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655 ("The Constitution guarantees that government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
'establishes a [state) religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.'") (quoting Lynchv. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 678 (1984)); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J. , concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(same) .

66. An important difference between the endorsement and coercion tests is that the endorsement test
invalidates a slightly wider range of government activity. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2673·76
(Souter, J., concurring) (rejecting notion that "state coercion of religious conformity, over and above state
endorsement of religious ci1erciseor belief, is a necessaryelement of an EstablishmentClause violation").
In particular, the endorsement test recognizesa stigmaticcomponent to majoritarianreligious practices that
can be independent of actual government pressure to conform to a particular religious belief. See
McO>nnell, supro note 23, at 164-65. Thus, the endorsement test balances the interests of majority and
minocity adherents in a different way than a test which focuses solely on coercion. Despite the desire of
a religious majority to celebrate its commonality, the endorsement test requires it to give way where its
celebration effectively excludes nonmembers from political participation.
67. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658 (finding "reasonable perception" of coercion); Lynch,
465 U.S. at 693 (O'O>nnor, J., concurring) (finding that cr~he display "cannot fairly be understood to
convey a mes.sageof government endorsement of religion").
68. In the most recent holiday display case before the O>urt, the Justices agreed on the use of the
endorsement test, but reached numerous different conclusions as to the religious or secular nature of the
symbols employed and as to whether, in light of these natures, the displays unconstitutionally endorsed
religious belief. See Alleghelf)', 492 U.S. S73 (holding crbchc display unconstitutional while holding
menorah display constitutional); id. at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (employing different perception analysis as to the menorah display); id. at 637 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that both displays are unconstitutional). Similarly,
coercion depends upon whether the government "give[s) direct benefits to religion in such a degree that
it in fact 'establishes a [state] relig"ionor religious faith, or tench to do so.•• Id. at 6S9 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678). Since some goverrunentuse
of reli&foussymbols could have this effect, id. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), the coercion test also depends upon perception and degree, and toos is highly variable); id. at fJJI
(plurality opinion) (pointing out indeterminacyof the coercion test); id. at 629 (O'O>nnor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (same).
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Court's understanding is that government actions that affect religious entities
or practitioners, either positively or negatively, but which are only a part of
an overall system of activity not specifically directed at religion, meet the
constitutional requirement of neutrality regardless of the magnitude of the
impact. Where, instead, government action singles religiou s entities or
practitioners out for disadvantageous treatment, the Court has held that such
an action violates the constitutional guarantee of government neutrality, unless
it is justified by a compelling state interest. Where a government action
specifically targets religious entities or practitioners for advantageous
treatment, the Court's understanding of the demands of neutrality becomes
more complex. Government actions that lift a burden that otherwise applicable
governmental rules would impose on a religious entity or practitioner are
constitutionally pe.rmissible, although not constitutionally required. Finally,
even if it does not lift a burden , such advantageous treatment is allowable if
it acknowledges particular religious traditions without coercing the participation
of those outside the tradition or, under the endorsement test, stigmatizing them
as being somehow outside the political community.
That these emerging interpretations can be identified indicates that the
Court is honing and refining its understanding of the neutrality that the religion
clauses require. Although clarity is certainly welcome, a successful
interpretation of the religion clauses by the Court will also depend on the
substance of the resulting understandings . Feminist legal insights provide a
crucial tool for evaluating the Court's substantive efforts.

Il. FEMINIST LEGAL INSIGHTS AND THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES

Feminist legal theory was developed by women as a critique of a le.gal
structure that systematically subordinated women. 69 Its initial focus was upon
areas of the law which affect women differently than men; these areas remain
its primary concern. 70 But as feminist legal theory has grown, its applicability
has expanded as well.
The crux of the feminist commitment is liberty, equality and justice for
71
all. In defining this commitment, feminists have had to face the question
of what those broad concepts mean in light of conflicting particular
interpretations, and the challenge of how practically to achieve the chosen
meanings. Despite the lack of a consensus on the exact interpretation of these
69. Leslie Bender,A Lawyer's PrimerOIi FeministThecry and Torr,38 J. LEGALEouc. 3, 4 (1988)
("Whateverthe focus of our particular work, all feminist efforts are combinedin struegle to eradicate
women'ssubordinatestatus.").
70. Ste Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Melhods, 103 HARV.L. REV. 829, 847 (1990)
(discussingimportanceof asking "the womanquestion· in law).
71. Carrie Menkel-Meadow,MainstreamingFeministLegal Theory,23 PAC. L.J. 1493, 1497 (" For
me, the feministprojectis ultimatelya humanistproject involvingthe pursuit of equality,justice, safety,
respect,compassionand well being for all.•). ,
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concepts, women's common ~xperience of subordination has yielded important
insights into what equality, liberty and justice must mean, and thus feminist
legal theory is relevant to any question that requires interpretation and
application of these ideals.
The appropriate modern meaning of the religion clauses presents just such
a question . In fact, the genesis of the religion clauses and their jurisprudence
parallels the birth and growth of feminist legal theory. The religion clauses are
an explicit constitutional embodiment of a commitment to a particular type of
freedom. The commitment grew out of circumstances that have now changed
in their conc rete parti culars. The guarantee, however, remains , and the task
of the Court is to decipher the meaning of that commitment in light of possible
conflicting and overlapping interpretations.
Although not specifically embodied in a constitutional provision ,72 feminist
legal theory originated with a commitment to gender freedom that was highly
dependent on its historical context.73 The meaning of the feminist commitment
to gender freedom has had to evolve in response to historical changes and
recognitions that have made the meanings of both of the component
terms-gender and freedom-in crea singly complex. Feminist legal efforts can
now appropriately inform the juri sprudence of the religion clauses. A brief
review of some of the relevant feminist legal insights will pave the way toward
applying them to the jurisprud ence of the religion clauses. 74
A. A Brief Description of Feminist Legal Insights

One feminist legal effort has been to expose the harm that the use of broad
legal concepts can impose upon politically and socially subordinated groups
if such co ncepts are not specifically defined and ju stified. In particular,

72. Women have used the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to achieve aspects
of gender freedom. See, e.g., J .E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (invalidating
prosecutor's ex:erciseof peremptory challenges on basis of gender); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(establishing intermediate scrutiny standard for gender classifications);Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(invalidating statutory preference for male estate administrators). This constitutional provision, however,
does not specifically address gender and certainly does not fonn the boundaries of feminist lep.l theory.
73. See generallyHISTORY
OFWOMAN
SUFFRAGE
{Elizabeth Cady Stantoneta!. eds., Ayer Co. 198S)
(1881-1922) (documentary history of struggle for women's suffrage).
74. The ifOWingbody of feminist theory both informs and is informed by other schools of legal and
political theory. See, e.g., Donna Greschner. FeministCcncemswiththeNew Ccmmunitarlans:WeDon't
NeedAllQthe.rHero, in LAWANDTHECOMMUNITY
119(Allan C. Hutchinson& Leslie J.M. Green eds.,
1989) (feminism and communitarianism);Linda Hirshman, '/he Book ofA, 78 TEX. L. RBV.971 (1992)
(discussing contribution of Aristotelian theory to questions of feminist theory); Margaret J. Radin, '/he
Feministand thePragmatist,63 S. CAL.L. REv. 1699(1990) (illustratingusefulness of combiningfeminist
and pragmatist approaches); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist CriticalTheories,42 Sr AN. L. REV.617 (1990)
(discussing relationship between critical legal theory and feminist theory); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virrue
and the Feminist Voice in Constitutional Adjudic!Jlion,
72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986) {feminismand civic
republicanism); Susan H. Williams, Feminist Jurispl"lldence
and Free SpeechTheory,68 TuL. L. REV,
1563, 1S71-72(1994) {providingdetailed ex.planationand justification of how and why the epistemologiQI
insights that she applies to free speech theory are feminist).
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feminists,75 like critical theorists, 76 have exposed the deceptive nature of the
concept of neutrality. Neutrality must always be defined by reference to a
preexisting set of conditions. These conditions are not themselves neutral in
the sense of equally addressing the interests and needs of all, but are
historically specific and have often been generated by the more powerful social
and political forc es to respond to their interests. 77 Nevertheless, the langua ge
of neutrality ca n create an undeserved aura of authority for a legal
judgment. 78
Another legal concept in need of specific definition is that of equality. The
Constitution (as interpreted by the Supr eme Court) 79 and various statutes 80
contain guara ntees of equal treatment of men and women. In addition to such
explicit guarantees, equality is often a legislative policy goal. By and large ,
courts and policymakers have interpreted the ideal of equality to requir e that
the government treat men and women the same . 81 Thu s, under both the
Constitution82 and many statutes, 83 a showing of differen t treatm ent
75. Su, e.g., Leslie Bender, Prom GenderDifference to FeministSolidarity: Using Carol Gilligan
and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. I, 19 (1990) (discussing importance of recognizing gender
biasesin ostensiblyneutral theory); Lucinda M. Finley, BreakingWomen's Silencein Law: The Dilemma
(/the GenderedNatureof Legal Reasoning,64 NOTIU!DAMEL. REv. 886, 893 (1989) ("Universal and
objectivethinking is male language because intellectually, economically, and politically privileged men
havehad the power to ignore other perspectivesand thus to come to think of their situation as the norm,
their reality as reality, and their views as objective."); Martha Minow, The Supreme Coun 1986
Term-Fore'NOrd:
Jusrice Engendered,IOI HARV.L. REV.10, 38-45 (1987) (discussing harm of "unstated
norm" in equal treatmentjurisprudence).
76. See, e.g., Joseph W. Singer, The Playerand rhe Cards:Nihilismand Legal Theory, 94 YALEL.J.
1, 40-47 (1984) (critiquing concept of neutrality).
77. As Catharine MacKinnon has written:
[T]he state is male in that objectivity is its norm. Objectivity is liberal legalism's conception of
itself. It le&itimizesitself by reflecting its view of existing society, a society it made and makes
by so seeing it, and calling that view, and that relation, practical rationality....
[The rule of
objectivity] ensures that the Jaw will most reinforce existing distributions of power when it most
closely adheres to its own highest ideal of fairness.
CatherineMacKinnon, Feminism,Marxism,.Method,and theStme: TowardFeministJurisprudence,8 SIGNS
635, 642 (1983).
78. Bartlett, supra note 70, at 862 & n.134 ("Feminists have found that neutral rules and procedures
tend to drive underground the ideologies of the decision maker, and that these ideologies do not serve
'M)men's interests well."); MARTHAMlNOW,MAKINOALLTHEDIFFERENCE:
(NCLUS10
N, ExCLUS
ION,
ANDAMERICAN LAW 34-3S (1990) ("(U]nfairness will result under the guise of objectivity ....
[D]ifferenceassigned by someone with power over a more vulnerable person will become endowed with
an apparentreality.•).
79. See U.S. CoNST.amend. XIV; Reed v. Recd, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (applying equal protection
clauseto invalidate a gender classification).
80. E.g., Title Vil of the Civil Rigltts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20003 (1982).
81. See,e.g., Reed,404·U.S. at 76 ("'(Alli persons similarly circumstancedshall be treated alike.'" )
(quotingRoyster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). Within feminist legal theory, this
type of argumentis called "equality as sameness." See, e.g., Menlcel-Meadow,supra note 71, at 1497-1502
(describingevolution of sameness-differencedebate within feminist legal theory).
82. See,e.g., Reed,404 U.S. at 75 ("[The statute] provides that different treatment be accorded to
the applicantson the basis of their sex: it thus establishesa classificationsubject to scrutiny under the Equal
ProtectionClause.").
83. Ste, e.g., InternationalBhd. of Teamsters v. UnitedStates, 431 U.S. 324, 33S n.15 (1977) (Under
Title VII, "'(d]isparate treatment' ... is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer
simplytreats some people less favorably thanothers because of their ... sex .... "). A plaintiff can also
establisha prima facie case of employment discriminationby showing that an employment policy ha.s a
disparate impact on women. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166(reinstituting the disparate
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establishes a prima facie showing of a violation. These constitutional and
statutory guarantees, and their judicial interpretations, have helped to ensure
that women receive the same treatment that men do. 84 This concept of
equality has exposed ideological assumptions about differences between men
and women which have often proved to be untrue, thereby helping to break
down stereotyped expectations about women's interests, capabilities, and
proper roles in the world. 85
Treating women exactly the same as men in the formal sense, however,
does not guarantee equal social, political, and economic standing. Because the
class of men, by and large, have created the standards of legal treatment, these
standards often correspond more directly to the interests and needs of men,
rather than those of women. 86 Truly equal treatment requires revising the
standard of treatment so that it meets equally the interests and needs of both
classes of people, rather than simply treating women according to the
preexisting standard. 87
The paradigmatic example of a need for such standard revision in order
to reach gender equality involves the treatment of pregnancy leave in the
workplace. In a sense, a benefits package which does not cover absences from
work due to pregnancy treats men and women equally in that members of both
sexes receive exactly the same benefit package: one that excludes childbirthrelated leave and benefits. as But the effect of this formal definition of equality
impact standard established in G~ggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
84. For decisions finding this guaranleein the Fourteenth Amendment, see Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7 (1975) (equal right to parental support); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (equal right
to claim spouses as dependents for receipt of mi.litarybenefits); and Reed, 404 U.S. at 71 (equal right to
be estate administrators). For a decision finding this guaranreein Title vn, see, for ex.ample,International
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (holdin&women have equal right to
employment which requires contact with hazardous substances).
85. CompareHoyt v. Flori<ta,368 U.S. S1, 62 (l96l)(justifying different rules for jury service on
grounds that "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life") and Goesaertv. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948) (affirming constitutionalityof statute prohibiting women from serving liquor) wi1hOrr
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979) ("[T)he 'old notio[n]' that 'generally it is the man's primary
responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,• can no longer justify a stalllte that discriminates on
the basis of gender.") (alteration in original) (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975)).
86. See, e.g., Bartlett, supranote 70, at 880 (noting "women's position of exclusion"); Clare.Dalton,
Where We Stand: Observationson 1heSi1uati0flof FeminisrLegal 'lhdughr,3 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J.
l, 6 (1987) ("Women have long, if not always, held the suspicion, if not the knowledge, that what passed
for point-of-view-less-nesswas in fact His point of view. A point of view which did not always correspond
to hers."); Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Evuy1hlng: The lll(Juiries of Feminisl JurlspnJdence, 1
BERKELEY
WOMEN'SL.J. 64, 68 (1986) (arguing that "women are le~ out" of "the categories used by
traditionally male modes of scholarship").
87. Within feminist theory this view of equality is called "equality as difference" or substantive
equality. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, EqualiryandFeministLegal Theary,48 U. Pm. L. REv. 1043,
lOSO(1987) ("[T)here is no logical, inherent link between differenceand /llequality."); see a.l.w MINOW,
supra note 78, at 20 {"The problem of inequalitycan be exacerbated both by treating members of minority
groups the same as members of the majority and by treating the two groups differently.").
88. See General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976) (holding that employer's disabilitybenefits plan which failed to cover pregnancy-related disabilities did not violate Title VII); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974) (holding that califomia statute that excluded such benefitswas not
invidious discrimination under equal protection clause); see also Wendy Williams, The EqualityCrisis:
Some Reflec1ionson Cu/Jure, Couns and Feminism,7 WOMEN'SRTS. L. REP. 175, 191-97 (1982)
(discussing Gilbertand Geduldigand arguing that pregnancy should not be treated as a "special casew).
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is that women will lose money and/or their jobs when they have children,
whereas men will not. The price of equality with respect to one variable is
inequality with respect to another.
There may thus exist a tension between two definitions of equality: formal
equality and substantive equality. Formal equality means equal treatment, while
substantive equality may mean different treatment that achieves an equal result.
So, for example, a state decision to provide women with guaranteed job leave
for childbirth may be consistent with the federal statutory . guarantee of
equality, even though the treatment that men and women receive under the
state statute is different. 89 The difference in benefits in fact achieves a certain
type of equality, which is that both men and women can have babies and keep
their jobs.
.
The differences between these two definitions of equality may force a
choice. Whichever definition is ultimately chosen will require justification. In
many instances, the benefits of formally equal treatment may justify resulting
substantive inequality. This precept was central to much early feminist
litigation, which was designed to undermine the idea that men and women are
essentially different. Yet in some instances the benefits of formally equal
treatment will not outweigh the unequal effect. Increasing numbers of feminists
are making the argument that attention must be paid to the actual social and
political circumstances of the people affected by any government action. Only
once this is done, some feminists argue, will courts be able to determine
whether women as a class will be disproportionately adversely impacted by
ostensibly equal government treatment.
Despite these arguments, however, the fact that formally equal treatment
needs to be justified as the best vision of equality is often lost in legal
interpretations and policy discussions. Support for this proposition can be
found in the discourse surrounding arguments in favor 9f achieving substantive
equality through different treatment. These arguments, such as the one that
· childbearing leave for women is a necessary component of workplace equality,
are often characterized as requests for "special" treatment. 90 From the point
of view of most women, however, physically bearing children is a normal part
of life, and it is the workplace standard that addresses only a special class of
workers-those who do not biologically bear children. 91 Thus the rhetoric of
89. CaliforniaFed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)("California's pregnancy
disability-leavestatute allows women, as well as men, to have families without losing their jobs.").
90. See,e.g., Guerra,479 U.S. at300 (White, J., dissenting) ("'[The PregnancyDiscriminationAct)
in no way provides special disabilitybenefits for working women.'") (quoting 123 CONG.REC. 29,664
(19n) (statementof Sen. Brooke)).
91. As Christine Littleton has written:
Given the way employmentis struetured, preanancy renders a woman unable to work for a few
days to a few months,just like illness and injury do for men. However, what makes pregnancy
a disability rather than, say, an additional ability, is the structure of work, not reproduction.
Normal pregnancy may make a woman unable to 'work' for days, weeks or months, but it also
makes her able to reproduce. From whose viewpointis the work that she camot do 'work,' and
the work that she is doing fl()f >M>rk'!
Certainlynot from hers.
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"special" treatment stigmatizes those who argue for it or receive it as asserting
entitlement to something outside what is "normal," and makes change directed
at redefining established norms more difficult to achieve.92 A primary
feminist effort is therefore to expose such .legal definitions as contingent and
disputed.
Liberty is another broad legal concept that feminist legal thought has found
dangerous without a precise and justified definition. In the case of liberty, the
presumed definition is negative. That is, the government preserves individual
liberty by not acting against individuals. This assumption underlies the
constitutional requirement that affirmative state action is required to establish
a vi~lation of individual rights guarantees .93 It also · forms the basis for
whatever lines the government, as a matter of policy, chooses to draw between
a public, regulated sphere and a private sphere that should be free of
government regulation. 94
To be sure, freedom from some forms of government regulation has always
been important to women as well as men. 95 But in other areas, freedom from
government intervention has meant different things for the individual liberti es
of women than for those of men. One example is the traditional exemption of
the "private" arena of activities that occur within the home from the "public"
sphere of government regulation. 96 While the intended effect of this division
might be to promote the individual liberty of both women and men by leaving
them free from intrusive government rules, the actual effect might be to deny
women liberty. 97 The absence of government regulation means that unjust
Christine A. Littrelon, Reconstrw:tingSexual Equaliry
, 15CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1306 (1987) (footnote
omitted). Moreover, women's and men's experierM;CS
after childbirth are likely to differ because of the
different social expectatio!U placed upon women and men with respect to childcare. The workplace, for
example, by and large assumes workers without childcare responsibilities to be the norm. See Joan C.
Williams,DeconstructingGender,87 MICH. L. REV.797, 836 ( 1989)("Feminists' goal must be to redesi&n
wage labor to take account of reproduction."); Wendy W. Williams, Notesfrom a First Generation,1989
U. CHI. LEGALF. 99, 108-09 (noting agreement among feminists "on a central reality: The workplace
is structured to respond to the life patternsof male workers and inadequatelyaccommodatesworkers who
become pregnant, give birth and carry majorparental responsibilities").
A. MACKINNON
, FEMINIS
M UNMODIFIED
38 (1987) ("If we're going to be
92. See CATHARJNB
stigmati1.edas different, it would be nice if the compensationwould fit the disparity.").
93. Su, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (interpreting earlier
Civil Rights Casesto establish "the essential dichotomy .•• between deprivation by the State, subject to
scrutiny under (the Fourteenth Amendment,) and private conduct . . . against which the Fourteenth
Amendment offers no shield").
94. See Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: FeminiseCritiq~s of dte Public/Pri~meDisrinaion, 10
CoNST. CoMMENT. 319 (1993) (elucidating and critiquing public/private distinction); Ruth Gavison,
Feminismand the Publlc/PriWJteD/stincrion,45 SrAN. L. REV. 1 (1992) (arguing that public/private
distinction should be altered but not abolished).
95. See, e.g., Gavison, supra note 94, at 36-37 ("!Do) women have no interest in the valuesof privacy
and intimacy, or (arc) there . •• no contexts in which women would want to keep the state out of their
lives? Presumably ... the answer is no.").
96. See generally Frances E. Olsen, TheMyth of Seatelntervensionin the Family, 18 U. MICH.J.L.
RBF. 835 (1985) (arguing that the ideal of "nonintervention" is incoherent and detrimental to womenand
children).
97. See Gavison, supra note 94, at 36 ("Women should ... recognize that invocations of the value
of privacy arc a means of perpetuating their oppression by creating the false impression that protection of
privacy is good for women, by isolating them, and by depoliticizingtheir struggle.").
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private power relationships endure, 91 and women are disproportionately the
less powerful marital partner physically, politically, and economically. For
example, nonregulation of the private sphere may decrease the liberty of
v.omen by leaving them vulnerable to domestic abuse. 99 In such a situation,
government regulation might enhance rather than inhibit the individual liberty
of women. 100
Similarly, one feminist view holds that the negative ideal of liberty
embodied in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the free speech clause of
the First Amendment protects the liberty of men while actually subverting the
liberty of women. 101 For example, some proponents of this view argue that
a constitutional doctrine that prohibits government regulation of .pornography102allows predominantly male speakers to define the public and private
image of women. These images, which portray women as subordinate to men,
reproduce subordinating treatment of women. Turning the free speech
argument on its head, spokeswomen for this view argue that pornographic
"speech" silences the v.omen it depicts, by defining them as less v.orthy and
less capable of speaking. 100
Other feminists, while acknowledging the dangerous effects of
pornography, nonetheless argue against its regulation. Although they are
equally concerned with women's liberty, they see state censorship of sexually
oriented speech as the greater threat to women's liberty. 104 Despite the
difference in their substantive prescriptions, these conflicting views lead to the
same conclusion that has emerged from competing feminist definitions of
equality-that no definition is self-evident. Any definition of "liberty" requires
justification in light of the various liberties that it will promote or hinder .
Underlying the feminist discussions of equality and liberty is a recognition
that these concepts are necessarily interrelated. In particular, some degree of
equality among individual.s is a necessary prerequisite for each individual to
possess liberty. Absent some degree of equality among individuals, liberty
guarantees mean that the more powerful individuals have the freedom to
98. See Olsen, supra note 94, at 326 ("[T]he standard situation in which one enjoys privacy and
freedom is not a situation of equality but one of hierarchy.").
99. See. e.g., Margaret Martin, BatreredWomen,in THE VIOLENTFAMILY
: VICTIMIZATION
OF
WOMEN,Clin.DREN, ANDELDERS 65, 82 (Nancy Hutchings ed., 1988).
42 STAN.L. REV. 617,6 31 (1990) (~Contrary
100. See Deborah L. Rhode, Femi11/stCritical1heories,
to liberal legal assumptions, the state's refusal to intervene in private mattershasnot necessarily expanded
individualautonomy; it hasoften simply substituted private for public power.").
101. See, e.g., Robin West, ReconstructingUberty, 59 TENN. L. RBV. 441, 443 (1992) ("[T]he
modem conception of ordered liberty is a largely empty promise for women.") .
102. See AmericanBooksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (71h Cir. 198S)(finding Indianapolis
anti-pornographyordinance drafted by CatharineMacKinnonand Andrea Dworkin inconsistent with free
speech guarantee of First Amendment),ajf'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
and Discrimination, 71 B.U.
103. See. e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornographyas De/QllliJtion
L. REV. 793 (1991).
104. See Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law,BriefAmici Curiaeo/FeminlstAnl/-Censorship
Taskforce,
et al., InAmeriCQII
BooksellersAssoclaJionv. Hudnut,21 u. MICH.J.L. REF. 69 (1987-1988); Mary C.
Dunlap, Suual Speechand the State: PuttingPornography/11its Place, 17 GoLDBN GATEu. L. REV.
359 (1987).
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impose their wills upon the less powerful and hence liberty for the less
powerful is illusory. 105 On the other hand, any state-imposed requirement
of equality among individuals diminishes some individual s' liberties. The trick,
of course, is to determine the right mix of state-imposed equality and stateguaranteed liberty .
Despite their common goal of gender freedom, there is no consensus
among feminists as to what this balance between government action and
inaction should be. 106 Feminists do agree that the law disproportionately
reflects the needs and interests of the more powerful class of men, thereby
unju stly diminishing women's equality and liberty._The remedy lies in forming
the law more in accordance with v.,omen's needs and interests. However, as
with any broad concept , the substance of "women's needs and interests" in
any parti cular situation is difficult to define . 107 The definition of substantive
liberty or equality varies among the members of the class of women according
to circumstances other than gender. 108 Consequently , there is a problem: how
are we to choose a definition? 109
One way to choose- a method that should be rejected-is to repeat the
activity that was the initial focus of feminist attention: that is, to accept legal
concepts that are defined in terms of the needs and interests of a more
powerful class of people. Feminists have been ,criticized for doing this and
have learned from the criticism. 110 In addition to a substantive commitment
to gender equality and liberty, feminist legal thought now contains a procedural
commitment to preserving liberty and equality in the process of defining these
concepts .
Recognition of the affirmative value of diverse perspectives underli es the
feminist procedural commitment. The characteristic urge of individuals in
defining legal concepts is to ignore conflicting perspectives and to define their
own perspective as universally shared. m To preserve the freedom of all
105. See, e.g., Slate v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453, 459 (1868) ("We will no more interfere
where the husband whips the wife than where lhe wife whips lhe husband .... ").
106. See JUDITHBt.rrLER, GENDERTROUBLE:FEMINISMAND THE SUBVERSION
OF lOEl'<"TITY
4 (1990)
(noting "the fragmentation within feminism and the paradoxical opposition to feminism from 'women'
whom feminism claims to represent"); Clare Dalton,supra note 86, at 7 ("(N]o single feminist narrative
or theory should imagine that it can speak univocallyfor all women.").
107. See Martha Minow, FeministReason:GeningIt andLosing It, 38 J. LEGALEouc. 47, 50 (1988)
("Any claim to speak from women's point of view, or to use women as a reference point, threatensto
obscure [the multiplicityof women's pointsof view] by representinga particularview as the view of all.").
108. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence:Groundingthe Theories, 4 BEJUCELEY
WOMEN'SL.J. 191 (1989) (discussing how feminist theorists often nealect the distinctive perspective of
lesbians); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginallzingthe bttersectionof Race and Sex, 1989 U. on. LEGAL
F. 139 (noting how feminist theorists often ii'lore different racial perspectives);Angela P. Harris, Race
and Essentialismin FeministLegal Theory,42 SrAN. L. REv. 581 (1990) (same).
109. Essentially, this is lhe dilemma of feminist epistemoloe}'.Set generally Susan H. Williams,
FeministLegal Eplstemclogy, 8 BBRKELEYWOMEN's
L.J. 63 (1993) (analyzingfeministattemptsto bridge
lhe gap between social constructivismand the defense of feminist values).
110. See, e.g., Minow, supra note \07.
111. See Bartlett, supra note 70, al 882 ("[The] requirementthat other perspectivesbe souaht out and
examined checks the characteristictendencyof all individuals- including feminists-to want to stamp their
own point of view upon the world."); Minow, supra note 107, at 5\ ("Cognitively, we need simplifying
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individuals, any system of defining legal concepts must check this urge to
privilege the perspectives of the more powerful. In particul ar, "the key to
increasing knowledge lies in the effort to extend one's limited perspective" by
attempting to "identify and understand the perspectives of others. " 112 No
observer can completely transcend her own perspective, so no legal definition
can be completely separate from the circumstances of the decisionmakers. 113
But some definitions can be more inclusive than others and thereby have
greater claims to be adopted as the legal definition that applies to all. 114
Feminists have therefore recognized that paying attention to diversity of
perspective is a crucial part of defining and justifying legal concepts.

B. Application of FeministLegal Insights
Feminist insights into the concept of neutrality directly apply to the
jurisprudence of the religion clauses, where government neutrality toward
religion is the "preeminent goal. " 115 The concept of government neutrality
as it is now used by the Court is meant to invoke impartiality and
evenhandedness, in the sense that government decisions are made without
respect to whether they advance or inhibit religious belief or practice. 116
Implicitly, the Court holds up this ideal of perspectiveless government
decisionmaking as possible and desirable. But it is impossible for the
government to act without a perspective on religion. Like gender identification
and the assumptions that go with it, religious identity and its accompanying
assumptions are inextricable components of our individual and collective \Wrld
views. Government decisions inevitably will reflect these perspectives.
The laws that the Court has recently characterized as "neutral" reflect
majority religious assumptions. This characteristic is most obvious in laws that
the Court has reviewed under the free exercise clause. Including peyote in a
broad list of illegal controlled substances" 7 ffil\kes sense only from the point
of view of those who do not recognize its religious significance. Similarly,

categ~ries·; and the ~fy ing category of 'woman' helps to organize experiertce,evenat the cost of denying
some of it.").
112. Bartlett, supro note 70, at 881-82.
113. Su Rhode, supra note 74, at 626 ("[AJII perspectivesare partial, but some are more incomplete
than others. ").
114. Su Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICK. L. REV. 1187 (1993) (arguiqg
that a dialogic methodologythat includesdifferent perspectives and regulates power disparities has a greater
claim to objectivity than a less inclusive methodology).
115. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 616 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. SeeChurch of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Y,· Qty of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 221.7( 1993) ("[l)f
tlileobject of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law
is not neutral .•.. "); Zobrest v. Catalina Footpills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993) (neutral
governmentprograms provide benefits "to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion").
117. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). But see Drug Enforcement Administration
Special Exempt Persons, 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1994)(exemptingtheNativeAmericanChurch from federal
laws prohibiting use of peyote).
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prohibiting military members from wearing head coverings indoors 118 or
requiring federal aid applicants to obtain a social security number 119 are rules
that developed from a majority religious perspective that did not recognize a
possible religious conflict.
. The "neutral" label is also deceptive as applied to generally applicable
programs that the Court has reviewed under the establishment clause. By and
large, mainstream religious groups benefit disproportionately from such
programs. One reason for this is that religious entities or practitioners can
benefit from government aid only if they are organized so as to take advantage
of the benefit. So, for example, religious organizations that own property will
benefit from property tax exemptions,120 religious groups with the critical
mass to warrant a student group will benefit from provisions that require equal
access to school facilities, 121 and more familiar forms of religious
contribution may be eligible for tax deductions while less familiar forms may
not. 122 Moreover, the government may "neutrally" employ religious entities
to transmit its messages, even though majority religious organizations will be
more likely to share the government's philosophy.123
Labelling these government actions "neutral" cJnlymakes sense from the
majority standpoint that views the religious perspective from which the rules
were made as "normal" or "natural." Feminist insights point out the stigma
attached to deviating from the accepted norm. The same is true with respect
to the majority religious norms. According to the Court, a constitutional
standard that led to exemptions for minority religious adherents from general
applicable rules would be "a constitutional anomaly. " 124
The Court's conflation of neutrality and impartiality is therefore deceptive
and dangerous. It privileges majority norms while purporting to effectuate
religious freedom. '.fhe Court defines government actions as neutral when it
finds that the government did not specifically intend to benefit or burden
religious practice. Under this interpretation, the clauses protect against burdens
on religion which government decisionmakers know about or can anticipate.
But government decisionmakers are most likely to be aware of burdens on
majority religious practices. Majority religious organizations, with more
connections to non-religious organizations, are also more likely to be
"incidental" beneficiaries of ostensibly neutral government programs.
Conversely, minority religious practices are more likely to be unwittingly
burdened by government actions, and less likely to be benefitted by
118. Goldmanv. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503(1986}.
119. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
120. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970}.
121. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990};Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981}.
122. Hernandezv. Commissioner,490 U.S. 680 (1989)(upholdingdenialof tax exemptionfor certain
paymentsto Church of Scientology).
123. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (holding that funding for counselingon
teenagesexuality may go to religious organizations).
124. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
·
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government actions not specifically directed at religion. The focus on neutrality
as lack of conscious intent to discriminate therefore rewards willful ignorance
of minority religious beliefs on the part of government decisionmakers with
less constitutional scrutiny. 125 Thus, although it uses the reassuring language
of neutrality, the Court has interpreted neutrality to encourage and protect
deeply rooted majority religious assumptions. Feminist analysis, in contrast,
values the redemption of the excluded perspective.
Compounding the majo~itarian bias in government actions is the use of a
majority religious perspective in judicial review. Where laws are not neutral
according to the Court's definition, the Court asks whether the explicit
recognition of religious entities or practitioners lifts a burden otherwise
imposed by the government on the religious practice, or if not, whether the
government action is a mere acknowledgment of religion rather than one that
coerces or endorses religious belief. Both of these judicial inqu iries reveal a
majority perspective.
Governmental actions which appear to deliberately benefit religion may
escape unconstitutionality if the Court determines that the action in fact restores
thefree exercise of a religion previously burdened by some other governmental
practice. The inquiry into previous burdens, however, is formal in the same
waythat the Court's neutrality inquiry is formal. The Court looks for laws that
explicitly prohibit mandatory religious practices, often ignoring the more
subtle, but pervasive, background of state-sanctioned social, economic, and
political actions that disproportionately burden particular religions or religious
practice generally.
Where the government advantages religion without lifting a preexisting
burden, the Court again unwittingly privileges majority religious perspe ctives
while purporting to guarantee religious liberty for all . .The tests that the Court
most frequently applies in this situation depend upon the perceptions of those
affected by the action. 126 Through these tests , at least some members of the
Court have attempted to adopt · a different point of view from a majority
religion adherent, forcing themselves to examine the perceptions of a
reasonable nonadherent. 127 Proponents of the endorsement test have argued
that the critical inquiry is whether the governmental action is '"sufficiently
likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an
endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual
religious choices. ,,,m Similarly, a majority of the Court held a non125. Cf. Barbara J. Fla&&,"Was Blind, But Now I Su": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory INent, 91 MICH.L. REV.953, 989 (1993) ("Invalidating only conscious
racismprovidesanincentivefor whitesto repressand denywhateverracist attitudes they in fact harbor.~).
126. Sees11pratext accompanyingnotes 63~8 (describing the endorsementand coercion tests) .
127. See Minow, supranote 75, at 47-49 (noting and praisina this effort by the Court to expand its
perspective).
128. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting School
Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985)); see alsoid. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("The question under endorsement analysis, in short, is whether a reasonable observer would view [a
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denominational high school graduation prayer unconstitutional because "a
reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group exercise
signified her own participation or approval of it." 129
Although this exercise expands the Court's perspective to a certain extent,
ultimately it results in homogenization rather than encouragement of religious
diversity. Certainly, the inquiry encourages the Court to adopt a non-majority
point of view. But basing the constitutionality of government action on a
nonadherent's perception compels the Court to define that perception; the
Court declares what perceptions are "reasonable" 130 and what message
viewers "may fairly understand" 131 to be endorsed through government
action. The purpose of employing the nonadherent's perspective is to prevent
nonadherents from being told "that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community. .,uz By its very nature, however, a test that defines the
"rea sonable" or "objective" perspective of a nonadherent defines other points
of view as not "fair understandings" 133 or, less gently, as "ludicrous. " 134
By declaring and adopting the point of view of the reasonable nonadherent,
the Court expands the circle of people who comprise the political community
but keeps the idea of the circle intact. Defining reasonable and unreasonable
religious perceptions. the Court makes judgments about the validity of religious
beliefs while ostensibly being careful not to make such judgments. 135
Defining standards in accordance with reasonable perceptions is not unique
to the jurisprudence of the religion clauses; this exercise is basic to lawmaking
and judicial review. Laws are standards that presumptively reflect the
reasonable perceptions of a majority of the relevant population. Moreover, in
interpreting the law, j udges routinely rely upon standards based on reasonable
community perceptions. A good example is the "reasonable person" standard
in tort law. Application of this standard determines in large part whether
individuals can be held liable for their harm-causing conduct. Since juries by
and large apply the reasonable person standard, every determination ofliability
is in part a statement of community perceptions as to whether the defendant
behaved reasonably.
But the very function of the reason~ble person standard in tort law is to
evaluate certain behavior and beliefs about appropriate behavior. The
possibility of being subject to a jury's determination of reasonableness also
shapes parties' future behavior and their beliefs about the consequences of that

practice) as a disapproval of his or her particular religious choices.") (citation omitted).
129. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992).

130. Id.
131. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668. 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688; see Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. See Lynch, 465 U ..S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
134. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. Cf. Employment Div . v. Smith, 494 U.S . 872, 887 (1990) (stating that ~courts must not presume
to determine the place of a particular belief in a relieion or the plausibility of a religious claim" while
holding that state may prohibit sacramental peyote use).
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behavior. The function of the reasonab le person standard is normative; it is
designed in part to deter behavior that is perceived by a majority of the
community to be unreasonable.
Unlike the reasonable person standard, the putative purpose of the religion
clauses is not to set behavioral norms, but to preserve a space for individual
decisions. 136 Individual choice and volition are crucial to the value of the
interest protected. In this context, judicial declarations of reasonable conduct
or majoritarian perceptions of conduct have an impact on the very value to be
protected. While not overtly punishing unreasonable perceptions, judicial
declarations of reasonable perceptions affect religious belief, privileging some
perspectives as reasonable and marginalizing others as unreasonable.
The Court's review of government actions reveals majority religious
assumptions in another way.In upholding government use of religious symbols
and practices, the Court has reasoned that the long-term and widespread use
of the symbol or the context in which it appears can secularize it and render
it less offensive to nonobservers. 137 Yet women's experience calls into
question the conclusion that long-term and pervasive use of a symbol somehow
renders it benign. 138 The historically pervasive use and acceptance of gender
roles has deeply entrenched those roles and rendered them less tractable; they
certainly have not become less oppressive by being long and deeply held. The
same insight applies to government sponsorship of religious symbols. From
the point of view of the non-adherent, the long-term use and pervasiveness of
the symbol may well render it more offensive rather than less so and thereby
heighten the threat to religious freedom. Using the American religious tradition
to justify the continuation of public religious practices begs the question in the
same way that using a tradition of discrimination to justify its continuation does.139
136. Su, e.g., Smilh, 494 U.S. at 877"("The free exercise of religion means .. . the right to believe
and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.").
137. See County of Alleiheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 585 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("Chanukah,
likeOiristmaa, is a cultural event as well as a religious holiday."): id. at S96 n.46 (referring to "ceremonial
deism"); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (noting that cr~he instills "a friendly community
spirit of good will in keeping with the season"); id. at 693 (O'Connor, 1., concurring) ("(G]overnment
aclcnowledementsof religion serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate
secular purposes of solemnizin&public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging
the recognitionof what is worthy of appreciation in society."): School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
303-04 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurrina) (noting that invocationsof a deity in patriotic exercises such as
the Pledae of Allegiance "no longer have a religious purpose or meanina"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 444 (1961) (upholding Sunday-<:losinalaws on grounds that they had lost their religiow
sienificance).
138. See, e.g., CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON
, Introduction: 1he Art of the Impossible, in FEMINISM
Ut.'MODIFIED
9 (1987) ("Gender inequality pervades the way we thinlc."); Leslie S. Gielow, Note, Sex
DiscriminationIn Newscasting, 84 MICH.L. REV.443, 447-49 (1985) ("Socioloiical studies confirm that
sex-role expectations pervade society (and) result in neeative reactions to those who do not conform and
also result in individuals being evaluated on different criteria according to sex.") (citations omitted).
139. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). This is not to say that the
SupremeCourt has never enp.ged in such question begging. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 19294 & n.6 (1986) (citing criminalization of sodomy at time of ratification of Fourteenth Amendment to
support holding that it is not a fundamentalright worthy of constitutionalprotection); Bradwell v. Illinois,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (holding state may bar women from the
practiceof law because women traditionally thought unfit for occupations of life).
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It is necessary to focus on the effect of government actions as well as their
intent in order to change government actions that ignore and thereby
subordinate minority religious interests. And a judicial determination of
perspective is not a reliable or appropriate guide to measure that effect. But
then how are we to define religious freedom and gauge the constitutionality
of government actions that affect religious belief and practice?
Although feminist legal insights insist that in examining questions under
the religion clauses we pay attention to the actual effect of government actions
as well as to their intent, this attention itself does not yield religious freedom.
Rather , by paying attention to both intentions and effects, we will complicate
the determination of what constitutes religious freedom in a particular
circumstance by revealing impacts on religious freedom that a more formal
analysis obscures. Additionally, the impacts on the ..religious freedom of various
entities and individuals will be in conflict with one another . Guaranteeing the
equality of some people will diminish the liberty of others, at least as they
perceive it. 140 What is required is a conception of religious freedom that can
reconcile these competing and conflicting equality and liberty interests. 141
Feminist legal insights can facilitate the reconciliation. Feminist legal
thinking has long maintained that individual liberty requires some degree of
equality. In ract, the focus of feminist legal efforts is often thought to be the
achievement of gender equality. But at the same time, the push for gender
equality has established that liberty is a necessary component in the pursuit of
equality. Because equality can mean different things in. different situations, a
choice as to the meaning is required, even among feminists. But it is incorrect
and damaging to the very goal of equality to project any chosen meaning of
equality as universally shared. To rail to acknowledge that any chosen meaning
represents only a partial understanding is to silence those who do not share that
meaning. Thus, it is critical that we preserve for all the freedom to have
unique and different perspectives if we are to achieve the feminist goal of
gender equality.
A similar emphasis on the value of the diversity of perspectives should
underpin the jurisprudence of the religion clauses. 142 Recognition of this
140, Cf. RONALDDWORX!N,
TAXINORIGHTSSERIOUSLY269-70 {1977) (arguing that the tension
between liberty and equality is often false because there is no right to liberty, defined as complete freedom
from government action).
141. See Alan E. Brownstein, HarmonizingThe Heavenlyand Eanhly Spheres:The FragmtJll(lt/on
and Synthesisof Religion,Equality, and Speechin the Cons1/1wton;
Sl OHIOST. L.J. 89, 93 (1990) ("The
key to understanding the religion clauses is to recogniie th[e] iension and accept the fact that the
establishment and free e,i:erciseclauses represent one additionalbattlefield in the war between liberty and
equality inlerests which is fought throughout the Constitution.~).
142. Inierpretation of the religion clauses in fact presents a particularly appropriate example of the
dilemma in feminist legal thought between preserving liberty and ensuring equality. Preserving liberty of
religious perspective often means protecting the private, unfette.red operation of religious institutions.
Women's experience demonstrates, however, thatprotectingprivatearrangementsfromgovernmentscrutiny
may often perpetuate private oppression. Religious organizations, like other private arrangements, are
largely male-<:ontrolled.Mary Becker, 1he Politics ef Women's Wrongsand the Bill of ·Righls": A
BicentennialPenpeaive, S9 U. Cm. L. REV. 453, 459 (1992). The religion clauses have therefore not
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value, combined with other feminist insights , can lead to a meaningful and
consistent definiti on of religious freedom.
The goal of preserving the diversi ty of perspectives requires that the
inquiry examine the effects of ostensibly neutral government actions. In the
context of the establishment clause, getting beyond the facial neutrality of
government aid and scrutinizing its effects would require first that we
determine who actually benefits from the government aid and in what ways
they benefit. Similarly , under the free exercise clause, the Court would need
to ask who is burdened by a government action that is not specifica lly directed
at religion and how heavy the burden s are.
In an inquiry under either clause, the status quo ante of the religious
entities or practitio ners affected by a government action would neces sarily be
relevant. Under the free exercise clause, minority r eligious status should lead
to a presumpti on that exemption from an otherwise applicable ·1aw is
constitutionally required. In establishment clause analysis, the same level of
aid to a majority religion might have a much greater silencing effect on
minority religion s than if the situation were reversed. Because the impact on
religious diversity is the touchstone , the different treatment would be consistent
with the aim of constitutional neutral ity.
Although it is easie r not to pay attention to the nature and magnitude of
the impact of a government action, the effect of th is inattention is to place
disproportionate burdens on less powerful religious entities and practitioners.
Nor does it signal judicial hostility towards majority religious beliefs to base
decisions in part on the minority status of those to be burdened by government
action where the decision might have been different if the burden ed party was
the majority religious group. 143 Rather, such an approach is a necessary
antidote to the natural advantage that more powerful religions have in the
political proces.s and in society in general, and to the conscious and
unconscious majority assumptions that create the context of government
decisionmaking and judic ial review.
This attention to the social and political status of religious entities and
practitioners is also appropriate when the question is whether the government
may intentionally confer a benefit even where no government legislation

empowered women to develop "an autonomous source of authority, meaning, value, and morality
independent of the state" as they have empowered men. Id. at 484. Rather, pro1ecting religious
organizationsfrom governmentscrutiny and regulation may often perpetuategender roles and attitudes thal
conflictwith individualliberty and equality for women. Id. at 454; see also Robin West, supra note IOI,
at 452. Many women, however, disagree with this assessment of organized religion. See, e.g., Brief
Amicu.sCuriae of ConcernedWomenfor America in Support of Petitioners at I, County of Alleghenyv.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (Nos. 87-2050, 88-90, 88-96) (1989) (citina purpose of CWA to "preserve, protect
and promotetraditionaland Judeo-Christianvalues• and advocatingreduced government interventioninto
activitiesof private religious organizations).
143. Justices have disagreed with this claim. See, e.g., Alleghcly, 492 U.S. at 6TI (KeMedy, J.,
concurringin part and dissentingin part) (criticizinga rule whereby "(!)hose religions enjoying the largest
followingmustbeconsigned to the starusofleast favored'faithsso as to avoid any possiblerisk of offending
membersof minorily religions.").
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explicitly imposes a burden. Because the line between lifting a burden on
religious practice and conferring a benefit is difficult to discern, a focus on
the impact of the government action, with special attention paid to the status
of the religious entities or practitioners affected, would provide the Court with
more reliable guidance. For example, finding a goveniment-sponsored menorah
display constitutional, while invalidating a similar creche display, may be
explicitly justified by reference to the minority political status of Judaism and
the fact that the societal celebration of the winter holiday season is skewed to
correspond to Christian religious practice. Similarly, the constitutionality of
aid to parochial schools might depend not upon whether the aid flows directly
or through an intermediary, but upon the effect of the aid. The Court should
investigate whether the aid enhances the power of the already powerful or
empowers religious entities or practitioners whose perspectives are not socially
and politically reinforced.
Of course, the Court will have to engage in some difficult line drawing if
it is to be guided by the goal of preserving religious diversity. Difficult
questions will arise. R>r example, does allowing a Christian student Bible
study group access to school rooms on an equal basis with other student groups
enhance or inhibit religious diversity? Though Christianity is the majority
religion in most contexts, it has been said that the public school curriculum
embodies the secular. A principled decision grounded in a commitment to
preserve religious diversity could go either way. A focus on the amount and
impact of the aid, however, might well help such an equal access policy to
pass constitutional scrutiny. The Court could note that all that is to be provided
is a meeting place, and that the government's association with the religious
practice extends only to condoning it as an appropriate activity among many
others. Moreover, the barriers to student entry would not be large. Therefore
other nonmajority religious groups could reasonably be expected to take
advantage of the access to school rooms and presumably could do so on an
unlimited basis.
The issue of government aid to private parochial schools is similarly
difficult. Private parochial schools are disproportionately Catholic. While it
is a branch of Christianity, Catholicism is more of a minority faith than the
socially dominant Protestantism. This fact should make a difference in
determining the constitutionality of government aid. Another fact that should
affect the constitutional analysis, however, is that other minority religions may
not be able to provide the elementary and secondary school education that
Catholicism does. Government aid that has the effect of substantially
privatizing a traditionally public activity will disadvantage these non-Catholic
minorities. Consequently, the constitutionality of government aid should depend
in part on a determination that it is not of such a magnitude to produce such
an unacceptable effect.
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In sum, the application of feminist insights to the jurisprudence of the
religion clauses would result in conceptions of religious · freedom and
government neutrality which are different from those currently held by the
Court. If religious freedom requires preserving religious diversity, then
neutrality must answer to the nature and magnitude of the impact of
government actions on diverse groups. Government activity is not neutral
simply because it appears so on its face. Where government action explicitly
treats some religious entities or practitioners differently from the rest of the
population, the difference between lifting a burden and conferring a benefit
should not be crucial .
Instead, the status of the religious entities or practitioners necessarily
affected by the action should raise certain presumptions. Where apparently
advantageous government action affects nonmajority groups or practitioner s,
the presumption should be that the government action enhances religious
freedom by preserving religious diversity. Where such advantageous action
aims at benefiting majority groups, the presumption should be that it decreases
religious freedom. Where the government action ostensibly imposes a burden,
the presumptions should be the opposite. Any workable rule will require that
these presumptions be rebuttable upon a showing that the actual effect of the
government action on minority religious groups is such as to overcome the
presumption. This aspect of the rule will require fact-specific determinations
in each case. But the presumptions and the underlying goal of preserving
religious diversity provide starting points for the explanation, justification, and
critical examination of the issues and the decision in each case.

m.Bo.ARDOF EDUCA170N OF KIRYASJOEL

VIUAGE SCHOOL D1snucr V.

GRUMET
The most recent case in which the Supreme Court has applied the religion
clauses is Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grwnet.1" In this decision, the Court reiterated and applied a number of the
religion clause themes discussed above.
The controversy in Grumet stemmed from the New York legislature's
decision to enact a statute creating a school district coterminous with the
boundaries of the Village of Kiryas Joel. The residents of Kiryas Joel are all
members of the Satmar Hasidic religious sect. The legislature apparently
enacted the statute because the Village residents and the local school district
had reached an impasse with regard to the provision of special education for
Kiryas Joel children with disabilities.
Almost all of the children in the Village are educated at private sexsegregated religious schools which are not equipped to provide special
education. Under federal and state law, handicapped children are en~tled to
M4. 114 s. Ct. 2481 ( 1994).
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special education se rvices even when . enrolled in private schools. 145 Starting
in 1984, the school district of which the Village was initially a part provided
special education in an annex to one of the Village's private schools. However,
in two 1985 cases, the Supreme Court held that public employees could not
constitutionally provide such services on parochial school premises. 146 In
response to these decisions, the local school district discontinued the provision
of special education on the private school premises and began providing the
special education for Kiryas Joel children at public schools located outside the
Village.
Kiryas Joel parents soon objected to the new arrangement, claiming that
their children suffered emotional trauma when educated in these schools. 147
Ultimately, all . but one of the c hildren were removed from the special
education program. 148 The New York legislature enacted the statute at issue
in Grumet to respond to these problems and serve the needs of the Satmar
children of Kiryas Joel. The statute authorized the "qualified voters" of the
Village to exercise "all the powers and duties of a union free school
district." 149
Pursuant to its new statutory authority, the Village established one special
educational school within the Village boundaries. 150 All nonhandicapped
students remained within the private schools . The new school and its
curriculum were public, and the teachers came from outside the Village . .The
schoo l served forty full-time students, over half of whom came from outside
the district, and approximately one hundred part-t ime parochial school stude nts
from the Village. All of the students that the school served belonged to the
Satmar Hasidic sect.
The lawsuit arose when the New York State School Board Association and
several citizen-taxpayers challenged the statute, arguing that it constituted an
unconstitutional establishment of religion. 151 A majority of the Justices
agreed. The Court opened its analysis by noting that both religion clauses
"compel[ ] the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion. " 151
The statute, it held, "depart[ed) from ~is constitutional com mand by
delegating the State's discretionary authority . . . to a group defined by its
character as a religious community. "u 3

· 1"4S. 114 S. Ct. at 248S (citini Individualswith DisabilitiesEducationAct, 20 U.S.C. § 1400et seq.
(1988 ed. & Supp. IV); N.Y. EDUC.LAW,ART.89 (McKinney 1981& Supp. 1994).
146. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (l98S); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985).
147. 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
148. Id. at 2486.
149. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 1989N. Y. Laws,ch. 748).
150. The new school district never established any other schools, as the other children within the
district remained at their parochial schools. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2487.
153. Id.
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The Court reasoned that "the distinction between a government's purpo seful
delegation on the basis of religion and a delegation on principles neutral to.
religion" was a crucial one.U4 The statute was not deemed to be one that
permissibly "accommodate[s] religious needs by alleviating special
burdens ... m Rather, the Court held that the Satmars sought and received "an
adjustment to [their] religiously grounded preferences that [the Court's] cases
do not countenance. " 156 Whereas "[p]rior decisions have allowed religious
communities and institutions to pursue their own interests free from
government interference," they have not allowed government to "single[ ] out
a particular religious sect for special treatment. " 157 This latter action raised
the critical constitutional question as to "whether the benefit received by the
Satmar community is one that the legislature will provide equally to other
religious (and noD!eligious) groups." "' Moreover, the Court explained, it
was "no less a constitutional problem" that the "benefit flows only to a .. .
single, small religi ous group. " 159 The Court stated that "the general
availability of any benefit provided religious groups or individuals" is the
principle the Court will invoke to "turn[ ] aside Establishment Clause
challenges. " 160
Finally, the fact that the statute referred to the "qualified voters" of the
Village, as opposed to a religious group per se, did not save it from
constitutional invalidity. The distinction, according to the Court, was "one of
form, not substance. " 161 The "analysis does not end with the text of the
statute at issue" when "the context ... effectively identifies the[ ] recipients
of governmental authority by reference to doctrinal adherence, even though
[the statute] does not do so expressly. " 162
Moreover, the Court held that although the legislative establishment of a
separate school district violated the establishment clause, constitutional
alternatives to address the needs of the handicapped Satmar children did exist.
The Court explained that because "the Satrnars. do not claim that separatism
is religiously mandated," special education could be provided by a public
school outside of the Vtllage. 163 The local school district might also provide
a separate special education program for the Village children at "a neutral site"
near one of the Village's private schools. 164
1S4. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.

2489.
2492.
2492-93 (footnoteomitted).
2493.
2491.
159. Id. at 2492.
160. Id. at 2491.
161. Id. at 2488.
162. Id. at 2489.
163. Id. at 2493. See also id. at 2492 n.9 ("[T]he Satmars prefer lo live together 'to facilitate
individualreligious observanceand maintainsocial, cultural andreligiousvalues,' but ... it is not 'against
their religion' to interact with others.") (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.l, Grumet(No. 9'.l-517)).
164. The Court's previousholdingthat public fundingof classeson parochialschool premisesviolates
the establishmentclause led the local schooldistrict to abandonthis type of specialeducation in the Village
at
at
at
at
at
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In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed that the Court's
"emphasis on equal treatment is ... eminently sound. " 165 She distinguished
"permissible, even praiseworthy" accommodations, which may involve
"treating those who share [a] belief differently from those who do not," from
"discriminations based on sect. " 166 By O'Connor's reasoning, a state law
may exempt sacramental wine from a general prohibition on alcohol
consumption, but may not constitutionally exempt such use by a particular
religious sect. O'Connor noted that although it presented a "close question,"
the statute at issue was not "a general accommodation," but "single[d] out a
particular religious group for favorable treatment. " 167 She was concerned that
the legislature retained discretion to deny similar requests made by other
religious groups. Given the possibility of such disparate treatment of religious
groups by the legislature, Justice O'Connor considered the validation of this
particular religious preference to be "dangerous. " 168 By contrast, she argued,
"a generally applicable scheme" that "set[s] forth neutral criteria that a village
must me~t to have a school district of its own . . . would be acceptable even
though it coincides with a village which was consciously created by its voters
as an enclave for their religious group. " 169
Justices Kennedy and Scalia both analyzed the statute as an
"accommodation," which alleviated a "burden" on the religious practices of
a minority sect, although Justice Kennedy wrote in concurrence and Justice
Scalia wrote in dissent. Kennedy reasoned that "the Establishment Clause
forbids the government to use religion as a line-drawing criterion. " r'° Justice
Scalia considered the government to be accommodating "religious practices"
that he viewed as being more precisely "cultural peculiarities. " 171 He also
placed great weight in his analysis on the facial neutrality of the statute, which
delegated authority to the Village voters rather than delegating it explicitly to
a religious entity. In Scalia's view, "when there is no special treatment there
is no possibility of religious favoritism. "m But even when there is such
special treatment, Scalia maintained, this fact is not dispositive in proving that
an action is unconstitutional. In fact, Scalia reasoned, in accommodating
religious practice, a legislature usually "seeks to solve a problem that applies
to members of only one or a few religions" 173 and "'follows the best of our
traditions'" when it does so. 174
and to require attendanceat schools outsidethe Village.See id. at 2496 (O'Connor, I., concurring)(citing
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and School Dist. of Grand Rapidsv. Ball , 473 U.S. 373 (19&5)).
165. Id. at 2497.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2497-98.
168. Id. at 2498.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2504 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissentina).
172. Id. at 2510.
173. Id. al 2513.
174. Id. at 2511-12 (quoting Zorach v. Oausen, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (19S2)).
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A. A Feminist Critique of the Coun's Analysis

As in almost all of its decisions under the religion clauses, the Supreme
Court's articulated goal in Grwnet_is government neutrality. The facts of the
case, howeve_r, indicate how difficult it can be to define neutrality, and how
difficult it can be to achieve it. The situation of the Village of Kiryas Joel
illustrates vividly that government neutrality, in the sense of impartiality
toward religious belief, is impossible in the context of public schoo ling.
One direct cause of conflict in this context is that the public school
curriculum itself is inconsistent with some religiou s beliefs. Apart from any
specific school subject matters, the more general "public interest in promoting
diversity and undei:standing in the public schoo ls" 175 is compatib le with most
mainstream religious and nonreligious world views, but not with some min ority
systems of religious belief. 176 Even for religious communiti es that are not
directly opposed to understanding and tolerating ways different from their own ,
the impact on religious liberty which will result from engaging in this type of
education is likely to differ according to the size of the affected community.
It is much easier, for example, for large religious groups to be "to lerant " and
to expose their children to diversity in school because the dangers of
assimilation are much less pronounced for them than they are for members of
small religious communities.
This concern about assimilation relates directly to the claim made by the
Kiryas Joel Satmars in Grumet. Becau se of its size and the variances between
its social, political, and familial norm s and those of the majority, the Satrnar
community is obviously quite cognizant of the dangers of assimilation. In
addition, because the gulf between the Satmars' way of life and that of the
majority is so wide, Satmar children are argua bly distinctively susceptible to
assimilationist forces in public school. Therefore, the impa ct of required
diversified public schooling on the religious freedom of the Satmars is different
from the impact on members of more mainstream religious faiths.
The Court recognized this type of clai m when it was made by an Amish
community in 1963. 177 In Wisconsin v. Yoder the Amish sought to exempt
their children from the last two years of compulsory high school education
because this level of education "interpose[d ] a serious barrier to the integration
of the Amish child into the Amish religious comm unity. " 171 In holding in
favor of the Amish free exercise clause claim, the Court noted the "hydraulic
insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards" that the "requirements of
17S. Id. at 249S (Stevens, J., concurring).
176. See Wisconsinv. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 212 (1973) ("In the Amish belief higher learning tends
IO developvaluesthey reject as influencesthat alienate man from God."); Naomi Maya Stolzenbera, "He
DrewA CircleThalShlltMe Out": Assimilation,lndoctrin01ion,and the Paradoxofa Uberal Education,
106 HARV.L. REV.S81 (1993) (discussingthe claims of some minority religious communitiesthat the
valuesof diversityand tolerance t.au&htin public schools undermined thei.r faiths).
177. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
178. Id. at 211-12.
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contemporary society" can impose upon a small religious sect devoted to a way
of life in conflict with widely accepted societal norms. 179 By contrast, in
Grumet, the Court found that the 'School district plan did not conflict with the
Satmars' religious freedom because "separatism is [not] religiously
mandated. " 180 This view overlooked the more subtle and pervasive influences
that , although not in direct conflict with Satmar religious practice, might be
equally damaging to any meaningful religious freedom for the Satmars. The
Court has built into its analysis in this context an unstated preference for a
public school model which is consistent with the majority religious and
nonreligious norm.
The emphasis the Court places on equal treatment further reinforces this
unstated preference for majority norms. Once the norm of treatment has been
adjusted to reflect certain preferences , then equal treatment with respect to
those norms begins to advance these built-in preferences. The preferences
which were initially excluded in determining what the norms should be remain
unaddressed and effectively marginalized. Thus the treatment that the Satmars
seek is "special" only in the sense that the handicapped education plan adopted
by the local school district has been modelled according to the majority world
views. 181
Because it judged equal treatment according to a majority norm, the Court
viewed the Satmars as receiving special advantageous treatment , which under
the establishment clause is particularly suspect . By contrast, the Court
characterized the Amish claim in Yoder as a claim that the Constitution
required that the Amish be exempt from a requirement which, while neutral
on its face, was a significant burden on Amish religious practice. Therefore
the Court reviewed the claim under the free exercise clause, under which
differential treatment based upon religious beliefs is constitutionally sound. In
both cases, however, the claimant needed affirmative government action to
obtain its'objective . The Ami sh desired a constitutionally mandated exemption;
the Satmars desired special legislative action. The current Court has expressed
its inclination to defer to legislative actions. The Court's perception in Grumet,
then, that the Satmars received a benefit from government action rather than
simply seeking to be left alone must be seen as crucial.
This way of characterizing the Grumet decision, however, reveals the
majoritarian bias in the Court's review. Whether a government action is said
to lift a burden on religious practice or to confer a benefit upon it depends
upon the perspective from which the action is viewed. Like other citizens, the
Satmars paid taxes that funded public handicapped education. The manner in
which the school board provided that their children would receive such special

· 179,,.Jd.·at ln, · . ··
180. 114 S. Ct. at 2493.
181. Su The Supreme Coun-Leodif!g Cases, 108 HAR
V. L. REV. 250, 256 (1994) (analyzingGrumet
and noting that "equal treatmentreinforcesthe majoritarianbias inherent in generallyapplicable laws").

1995)

Feminist Legal Theory and the Religion Clauses

169

education affected their children and threatened their community
disproportionately. This disproportionate impact stemmed from their particular
religious beliefs and practices. From the Satmars' perspective, therefore, New
York's statute did not confer a benefit above and beyond the benefits that other
groups received. Rather, it lifted a burden that was pl.aced on the Satmars
alone. Because the line between lifting a burden and_ conferring a benefit
depends so crucially upon perspective, the line serves as an unreliable and
inappropriate measure of the constitutio nality of government action. 182
The bias of judicial review of religion clalJSe cases is also apparent in the
Court's willingness in Grumet to look qeyond the form of New York's action
to its substance, a move that the Court is usually reluctant to make. In
particular, Grumet demonstrates that the currept Court will look beyond the
facial neutrality or'a government action when it suspects that government is
intentionally treating some religious groups or practitioners differe ntly. Where
it is not intentional or "purposeful" action that treats different relig ious groups
differently, but only the impact of the action wpich creates the difference, that
action's formal neutrality will ensure its constitutionality. While this deeper
level of judicial review may help protect the religious freedom of less powerful
groups and individuals when it is used to ferret out religious -based action that
is disadvantageous to those "single [d] out, " 113 it . has the opposite effect
where the government action is advantageous to smaller, less mainstream
religious groups. In Grumet, the Court invalidated the government action as
being based unconstitutionally upon "religious identity. " 184 But in general ,
facially neutral programs which have the effect of disproportionately aiding
some religious groups or practitioners, whomever they may be, will survive
constitutional scrutiny. The current method which the Court employs to
determine when the form of government action will contro l , and when the
substance or real impacts of government action will control, can thus be
disadvantageous to smaller, minority religious groups. These groups may need
specific government attention and action to counteract legal presumptions that
threaten their religious freedom.
In numerous ways, the Court's decision in Grumet results in privileging
the religious freedom of mainstre am religious groups and entities over that of
small religious groups. Of course, one does not prove that New York's original
plan is unconstitutional in the same stroke in which one reveal s that it has a

182. Justice O' Connor' s proposed distinction between accommodationsand "discriminations based
on sect" is similarly indetenninate. Id. at 2497. She would find an exemption from a aeneral prohibit.ion
for sacramental wine to be constitutional and one that distinguished among the sects using it to be
unconstitutional.But what about an exemption for wine but not for other prohibited drugs used in reliaious
ceremonies?
Justice O'Connor dissented from the Court's holdina that a similar distinction with respect
to tax exemptionsfor religious contributionswas constitutional. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S.
680, 704 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Like other proposed distinctions. her distinction depends upon
a classificationwhic'h in tum depends upon perceptions; such perceptions inevitably differ.
183. 114S. Ct. at 2493.
184. Id. at 2489.
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special burdensome impact on the Satmars. But in highlighting the impact in
the context of the Court's reasoning, we do bring a critical view to bearupon
the Court's conception of government neutrality and the ideal of religious
freedom.
'
B. Rewriting the Grumet Decision to Preserve Religious Diversity
The question we want to ask is whether the Court's religious clause
jurisprudence effectuates the ideal of preserving religious diversity that feminist
legal thought recommends. Tu answer this question we must direct separate
attention to the Court's analysis in Grumet and to the result of that analysis.
A revised analysis which seeks to preserve religious diversity would differ
from the Supreme Court's in a number of ways. Most fundamentally, the
revised analysis would consider the minority status of the Satmars to be quite
relevant, working from the presumption that the apparently beneficial New
York legislative action works to preserve religious diversity. At the same time,
drawing distinctions between lifting a burden on religious practice and
conferring a benefit, _and between intentional and unintentional impacts on
religious practice would not be critical in this analysis. Nor would the
distinctions between equal treatment and special treatment, nor between
government action and inaction, control the decision as to whether the State's
action was unconstitutional. Instead, the inquiry would focus on the actual
effects of the legislation with respect to the religious freedom of different
religious groups. Specifically, in Grumet, where New York adopted special
proactive measures, the question would be whether its actions fail to preserve
religious diversity in a manner that is unconstitutional.
To answer this question the Court would have to ascertain the effects of
the statute that created the separate school district for the Village of Kiryas
Joel, both on the religious freedom of the Satmars and of other individuals and
groups. As the Court noted, the Satmars received treatment different from
what would be expected under customary school districting policy. Although
this special arrangement conflicts with the ideal of equal treatment, the Court
should determine whether the different treatment serves to ensure a different
type of equality, and whether the protection of this different type of equality
is consistent with the preservation of religious diversity.
The quest for equal treatment stems from our concern that "special
treatrnent" 185 necessarily means government "favoritism. " 186 Such
favoritism is inconsistent with religious diversity when its effect is to burden
religious groups or practitioners who do not receive the favorable government
treatment. However, the fact that special government treatment is directed at
a nonmajority religious group such as the Satmars increases the likelihood.that
.,.;
..
185. td: at 2493.
186. Id. at 2491.

1995]

Feminist Legal Theory and the Religion Clauses

171

the government action achieves a different type of equality. In Grumet, this
different type of equality is realized in a statute that ensures that both Satmars
and non-Satmars can receive a special education for their handicapped children
which does not offend their religious beliefs or impede their ability to freely
practice their religion.
Once we have identified this alternate vision of equality achieved through
different government treatment, we must determine whether the government's
action conflicts with the preservation of religious diversity. In this analysis the
effect of the New York statute on the religious freedom of non-Satmars must
be balanced against the Satmars' religious freedom that the statute helps to
achieve. To be sure, the Grumet statute. diminishes somew hat the ability of
non-Satmars to receive a public education in the company of a broad range of
religious practitioners which would include Satmars. The question, however,
is whether a desire for forced integration is of greater constitutional magnitude
than the Satmars' desire to preserve their religious integrity . Contact can lead
to greater understanding and acceptance. But it can also lead to assimilation
and homogenization . A concern for preserving religious diversity counsels
against a constitutional rule that forbids government from allowing religious
groups to isolate themselves. Moreover, a determination in Grumet must be
made in light of the particular context. Most Satmar children already attend
private schoo ls. The isolation effected by the statu te only applies to
handicapped education. Even this isolation preexisted the statute because most
of the Satmars refu sed to send their handicapped children to the public schools.
For these rea so ns, the substantive equality achieved by the New York statu te
in Grumet appears at least as likely to preserve the religious diversity that the
religion clauses guarantee as a policy of equal treatment would.
Several factors, if altered slightly, could change this constitutional analy sis.
First, the result might be different if New York's statute appeared likely to
cause substan tial factionalization and privatization of elementary and secondary
education along religiou s lines . Although all relig ious groups theoretically
would have equal license to form their own public schools, some groups would
be more affected than other s by this privatization of a previously public
activity. The se groups would be primarily small minority religious groups.
Consequently, to the extent that state action aimed at preserving the religiou s
freedom of one minority group would have this effect on other minority
groups, it would be constitutio nally suspect. In Grumet, however , this effect
does not appear sufficiently likely to warrant a finding that the statute is
unconstitutional. Moreover, the Court could uphold the creation of the Kiryas
Joel school district and still find a different specially created district to be
unconstitutional in circumstances where substa ntial factionalization and
privatization would seem to be the likely results .
A second change that might affect the outcome of the constitutional analysis
\\Quid be evidence of discriminatory application of the school districting
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requirements to religious or nonreligious groups, that is, an application
motivated by animus toward particular group s. The Court inyalidated New
York's statute based in part on this possibility. But the questi on is whether a
preemptive strike is necessary to achieve the goal of preserving religious
diversity. It is certain that this type of discriminatory application would pose
a real threat to the goal of preserving religious diversity, whether or not the
religiou s groups favored were minorities . In a case in which the recipient of
the special treatment is in fact a minority group, however, the better
constitutional rule would be to engage in an analysis of the particular case and
await a claim that such discriminatory action is actually occurring. The fact
that the group which benefits from the government's action is presumably
unable to control the political decisionmaking process should lessen the
suspicion that would otherwise attach to discretionary government action that
is based overtly upon religion. Furthermor e, as with the danger of extensive
privatization of public sphere activities, the fact that one case arising under the
statute does not involve discrimination does not mean that if proof of
discrimination is offered in a different case involving the statute the Court
would be powerless to declare that government action unconstitutional because
of a conflict with the goal of preserving religious diversity.
CONCLUSION

Feminist legal insights are constantly developing and changing in response
to the following question : What is freedom and how should we best attempt
to achieve it? Because this same question is very much at issue in the
interpretation of the religion clauses, feminist legal insights are an important
aid to their meaning . The fundamental femin ist rec ognition is that there is
value in preserving a diversity of perspectives on any particular issue, even
though those perspectives may be in great conflict. This recognition has
significance for the jurisprudence of the religion clauses as well , where
religious freedom for all is the goal. Any particular conception of religious
freedom must yield to the value of preserving all conceptions. This value can
guide the Court in its interpretation of both the establishment clause and the
free exercise clause , thereby resolving the apparent tension between them.

